We construct a unique dataset containing 17.516 Portuguese small, medium and large firms and spanning from 1996 to 2004. Using this dataset we study the impact of the number of banks a firm borrows from on the cost of bank loans.
Introduction
A frequently visited question by banking researchers is: what is the optimal number of banks for a firm to borrow from? This question is also important to firm managers because the answer to it is related to how to obtain the lowest cost of loans and how to ensure easy access to bank loans. In this study, we focus on the relationship between the interest rate charged by banks and the number of banks that the firm borrows from.
The classical delegated monitoring argument introduced by Diamond (1984) and tested by Petersen and Rajan (1994) says that in the presence of asymmetric information between firms and investors, a firm is best off borrowing from only one bank where the cost of borrowing is minimized. However, many other empirical works find that firms rarely keep exclusive bank relationships. For example, Ongena and Smith (2000) in a survey including 1079 firms across 20 European countries find that the majority of firms (85%) use more than one bank. They find that firms in countries with the French legal system, such as France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, have on average, more than 10 different bank relations. This observation has also been found in D'Auria, Foglia and Reedtz (1999) . In our dataset we also find that the majority of Portuguese firms, including micro firms, borrow from several banks.
What makes monogamy with a bank undesirable? There are many theories attempting to provide an explanation, some of them also have implications for interest rates.
First, in an exclusive bank relationship, the informationally privileged bank might exploit its bargaining power over the firm and extract rents from loan contracts (Sharpe 1990 , Rajan 1992 . This implies that micro and small firms with a unique lender pay a higher cost of borrowing.
Second, the refusal of a credit from the firm's only lender may provide a negative signal to the market which makes the exclusive bank relationship undesirable (Berger and Udell, 1998) . Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) show that this is especially true in economies with high bankruptcy costs and low fragility of the banking sector .
Third, some predict that multiple bank relationships will occur when banks face financial constraints or monitoring costs (Dewatripont and Fourth, multiple bank relationships might prevent the firm manager from strategic default by holding up the renegotiation process (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996) .
Fifth, in the face of fierce competition, multiple arms-length lending might substitute relationship lending as analyzed by Boot and Thakor (2000) . The authors predict that bank competition will lead to lower interest rates and that firms will not commit to exclusive bank relationships. On the other hand relationship lending might protect banks from price competition.
Sixth, multiple bank relationships allow banks to diversify their lending risk (Carletti et al. 2007 ). The authors predict that the banks are more attracted to multiple-bank lending when the bank has lower equity, when the cost of monitoring is high, and when the profitability of the firm is low.
To answer the aforementioned question we use a unique dataset that spans from 1996 to 2004 and includes 42.263 Portuguese firm-year observations, referring to 17.516 different firms. We find that an average Portuguese firm borrows from three banks. The firm's interest rate on bank loans lowers as the firm borrows from more banks, controlling for relevant firm characteristics. One additional relationship reduces the interest rate on bank loans by 12 to 34 basis points on average. This pattern holds regardless of the firm size. Moreover, we take seriously the idea that the number of bank relationships and the cost of borrowing may be simultaneously determined, introducing an endogeneity problem in our empirical analysis. For instance, the managerial ability may jointly influence the choice of the number of banks and the interest rate that banks charge. We address this issue by using an instrumental variable approach and find that our previous findings are robust.
Our finding is consistent with Carletti et al. (2007) that banks benefit from risk diversification brought by multiple-bank lending. The decreasing interest rate reflects that the reduction in risk level overcomes free-riding and duplication of monitoring costs.
However, to the contrary of the prediction of Carletti et al. (2007) that the benefit of diversification is stronger with small opaque less profitable firms, we find that the negative correlation between the number of banks and the interest rate holds robust across all firm sizes. Specifically, even large mature profitable firms benefit from multiple lending.
The finding that the interest rate decreases in the number of banks can also be consistent with the competition argument by Boot and Thakor (2000) that when banks compete to gain clients, firms are able to borrow from multiple banks at lower costs.
During the past two decades, the banking sector in Portugal has experienced a high degree of liberalization. Most of the state-owned banks have become privatized. Many small banks coexist with large regional banks. Credit granted to the private sector has recorded a remarkable growth and interest rates decreased steadily (Ribeiro 2007).
These developments should have contributed to increased competition in the Portuguese banking system, thus allowing firms to borrow from multiple banks at a lower cost.
Our results are comparable to findings from similar studies using European datasets. Degryse and Ongena (2007) literature review shows that in several European countries the cost of bank loans is either unaffected or reduced by 1 to 10 basis points per additional relationship, while in the US the cost of bank loans typically increases with the number of bank relationships.
Finally, this study is related to Farinha and Santos (2002) who also investigated the number of bank relationships in Portugal. They focus on one special event during a firm's borrowing history, i.e. when the firm switches from single to multiple bank relationships. The authors examine some of the determinants and implications of this corporate event and report that almost all firms start borrowing only from a single bank, but soon afterwards they diversify their creditor structure, most notably when growth opportunities are stronger. Our study is different in several ways. First, we look at the number of bank relationship rather than the event of switch from one to multiple banks.
Second, we focus on the implication of bank relations on the firm's cost of borrowing which was not examined previously for Portugal. Third, our dataset covers a more recent Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the datasets used and present some relevant summary statistics. In section 3 we discuss the results obtained under a regression analysis framework, evaluating how does the number of bank relationships influences borrowing costs. In section 4 we discuss possible endogeneity problems in the regressions, given that the number of relationships and interest rates may be simultaneously determined, and we try to overcome this issue using an instrumental variable approach. Finally, in section 5 we present some concluding remarks.
6
Two large datasets were used in this work. All information concerning the number of bank relationships comes from the Central Credit Register of Banco de Portugal. This extensive database includes information on all credit exposures above 50 euros, reported by all Portuguese credit institutions monthly. (The reporting is mandatory.) The main objective of this database is to disseminate information between participating institutions, in order to improve their credit risk assessment on current and potential borrowers.
Participating banks can observe, for each borrower, the number of bank relationships this borrower has, the total outstanding debt, as well as the status of the loans (e.g.
whether there is debt overdue). This information sharing mechanism may have important implications in reducing the asymmetric information problem in a borrower-lender relationship 1 . Unfortunately, this database does not include any information regarding loan maturity, collateral or interest rates. Given that our main objective is to evaluate the role of the number of bank relationships in firms' borrowing costs, we obtain information on the cost of borrowing from another large dataset: the Central Balance Even though both databases were created before 1996, several important fields of the Central Balance Sheet Database are available only from 1996 onwards, thus imposing this year as a starting point for our analysis.
In our study, we only study lending relationships between firms and banks, excluding all lending relationships with non-monetary credit institutions, such as leasing compa-
To measure the cost of borrowing, we construct different implicit interest rates using the firms' balance sheet information. We perform several checks to evaluate the reliability of our interest rate measures. Our preferred measure of the interest rate is the interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions. We provide a detailed description of our filters in the data appendix. Our final dataset is an unbalanced panel data containing 42.263 observations, 17.516 firms, between 1996 and 2004. The upper panel of Figure 2 shows histograms of both the implicit bank interest rate and the implied spread over the entire sample. The implied spread on banks loans is defined as the difference between the implicit interest rate and a money market interest rate (3-month Euribor). In the lower panel of Figure 2 we present the histograms of both the implicit interest rate and the spread for each year in our sample 4 . Overall the relatively high correlation between our measure and the aggregate interest rate on loans makes us confident about our measure of interest rate on bank loans.
We now turn to some preliminary analysis on the linkage between the cost of debt Figure 3 shows that the average number of bank relationships did not vary significantly over time, ranging between 2.8 and 3.3 across the sample period 5 . Figure 4 shows that the number of lending relationships increases steadily with the firm age. Start-up firms have, on average, 2 or 3 lending relationships, whereas older firms hold a more diversified credit structure. Furthermore, younger firms pay higher interest rates than older firms, as expected. Table 2 displays the number of bank relationships and the implicit interest rate for these four categories.
Micro and small firms hold respectively, on average, 2 and 3 bank relationships, medium firms borrow from more than 4 banks, while larger firms have 6 different bank relationships. Table 2 also shows that the implicit interest rate decreases with the firm size. Table 3 shows that the average number of bank relationships does not vary significantly across different economic sectors. The lowest number of relationships is seen in agriculture, fishing and tourism. In turn, mining, manufacturing and public services firms show a higher average number of relationships. The differences in estimated interest rates across sectors seem to be more significant. Agriculture and transport firms apparently have to pay interest rates slightly above those of other firms, whereas utilities, real estate firms or public services firms face lower debt servicing costs. 6 To ease the reading of the table we exclude the firms with more than 15 relationships. 7 Micro firms are defined as those than less 10 employees and less than 2 millions euros of sales volumes. Small firms are those with less than 50 employees and less than 10 millions euros of sales volumes. Median firms are those with less than 250 employees and less than 50 millions euros of sales volumes. All remaining firms are considered to be large firms.
To conclude our descriptive analysis we perform mean comparison tests to evaluate if interest rates are statistically different for firms with many relationships (above the 4th quartile of the distribution of the number of relationships) and for firms with few relationships (below the 1st quartile of the same distribution). Table 4 reports that in the full sample interest rates paid by these two groups of firms are indeed different. Firms with fewer relationships pay, on average, higher interest rates. We also performed these tests for the four size categories. Both for micro and for small firms, interest rates are statistically higher for firms with fewer relationships. For medium-sized firms, the mean comparison tests performed suggest that there are no significant differences in interest rates for firms in the 1st and in the 4th quartile of the distribution of the number of relationships. Finally, for large firms interest rates are significantly higher with many bank relations.
Regressions
The descriptive analysis performed above suggests that firms that have one or few lending relationships pay, on average, higher interest rates, most notably if they are smaller firms.
In this section, we perform regression analysis and control for several firm characteristics which may influence interest paid on bank loans and have been extensively used in similar studies. For instance, it is reasonable to consider that profitability, collateral, leverage or the firm's credit risk are taken into account by banks when pricing loans. We define Turnover as sales and services as a percentage of the firm's assets and use it as a proxy for the firm profitability. More profitable firms are able to generate larger cash-flows with their activity, and may face lower funding costs. Next we define Tangible assets as % of debt to proxy for collateral. Leverage is defined as debt to credit institutions over assets to control for the influence of the outstanding debt on the interest rate. Credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one whenever the firm is in default at the end of the year. Debt coverage, calculated as net profits over debt to credit institutions, is another measure of the firm's financial health. All firm-specific variables are lagged by one year. This choice is motivated by the fact that the banks can only observe the previous year's balance sheet. Table 5 reports summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Table 6 contains the correlation matrix of the regressors.
We also add a set of sectorial and time dummies. The sample period corresponds to a time of structural change in the Portuguese banking sector as well as the convergence and the access to the EMU. These developments contributed to the steady downward trend seen in interest rates during this period, thus emphasizing the importance of controlling for time effects in the regressions.
Our panel data contains information for 17.516 firms over 9 years (from 1996 until 2004). This is a unbalanced panel and each firm has on average 2.4 years of data.
In Table 7 we present our first estimates of how the number of bank relationships influences firms' borrowing costs, measured by our implicit bank interest rate. We begin by regressing the implicit bank interest rate on the number of bank relationships and time effects with firm fixed-effect. The results, shown in the first column of Table 7 , give support to the hypothesis that the number of bank relationships does influence firm's borrowing costs. The coefficient on Number of bank relationships is -0.142 with a tstatistic of -6.36. Quantitatively we find that one additional bank relationship decreases the interest rate by 14 basis points.
Columns two to five of Table 7 repeat the same regression for each size category.
We find that Number of relationships decreases the cost of debt for all firm sizes, the coefficients all significant at 1% level. The largest slope coefficient is for micro firms: an additional bank relationship reduces the interest rate on average by 21 basis points for micro firms and between 12 and 14 basis points for the other three categories.
Next we control for the firm characteristics, including Turnover, Tangible assets as % of debt, Leverage, Credit risk, Debt coverage and Firm age. Columns six to ten in Table   7 report the results of our fixed effects estimates for the full sample and the four size categories. The number of observations is reduced by approximately half because of the inclusion of the lagged variables. All coefficients show up with the expected sign when statistically significant. For the full sample, one additional bank relationship decreases the interest rate by 12 basis points. Turnover, Tangible assets as % of debt, Debt coverage and Firm age reduce interest rates, while Leverage and Credit risk have the opposite effect. The results are very similar to the previous set of regressions without the firm controls. The ranking of the importance of Number of relationships across the size categories is preserved. However, the coefficient of Number of relationships for the micro firms is significant only at the 10% level. This is probably due to the relatively small number of micro firms that report continuously to the Central Balance Sheet Database.
When we add the lagged firm controls, the number of micro firms goes from 6770 to only 2491. The time dummies are highly significant, suggesting that it is important to control for macroeconomic and financial developments.
As a robustness test, we decide to construct a different measure of the number of bank relationships. More specifically, we define Concentration in Lending (HHI) and construct it as a Herfindahl Index of the amount of loans from different banks at the firm level in order to control for the dispersion of borrowing, which is a feature not directly captured by Number of Bank Relationships. Table 8 To summarize, we find strong evidence that the number of bank relationships is significantly negatively related to the interest rate that banks charge. Thus in Portugal the benefit of keeping an exclusive bank relationship does not seem to reduce the cost of borrowing, at least in the last decade.
Endogeneity
We are seriously concerned with the idea that the number of bank relationships and the cost of borrowing may be simultaneously determined, which introduces an endogeneity problem in our empirical analysis. For instance, the unobservable managerial ability may jointly influence the choice of the number of banks and the interest rate that banks charge.
A manager with good negotiation skills may be able to maintain strong relationships with multiple banks and at the same time be able to bargain a lower cost of debt.
We address this issue by using an instrumental variable approach. We instrument the number of bank relationships by the change in the number of bank relationship from the previous year, i.e. Number of Bank Relationships(t)-Number of Bank Relationships(t-1).
We consider this to be a good instrument because a changes in the number of banks can influence the cost of debt that the firm can obtain only through the number of bank relationships, other firm characteristics controlled for.
In Table 9 , we run the same set of regressions using the above-mentioned instrument for Number of Bank Relationships and find that our previous findings are robust. The slope coefficient for Number of Bank Relationships is larger: An additional bank relationship reduces the cost of debt by 34 basis points on average, more than doubling the previously obtained coefficient. Moreover, this finding holds significant across all firm size categories.
Concluding remarks
We construct a unique dataset containing 17.516 Portuguese small, medium and large Against this background, it is challenging to understand why having a larger number of lending relationships has a positive impact on borrowing costs, especially for smaller firms. In fact, most of the literature points to the benefits of holding exclusive relationships, which allow for the reduction in the asymmetric information problem, most notably for smaller firms for which not much public information is available. But this is clearly the opposite of what our results suggest. One possible explanation for this may be that firms which lend from a smaller number of banks may be, in some way, more financially constrained than others. Taking into account that in Portugal it is quite com-mon to have a large number of relationships firms that lend from one or few banks may do so not because they choose to, but perhaps because not many banks are willing to lend to them. It may be possible that this reflects the usual asymmetric information in a relationship between a bank and a firm. However, instead of reducing this asymmetric information problem by establishing long and exclusive relationships with firms, banks may prefer to obtain information from other lenders. In this domain, it is important to recall that part of the information contained in the Central Credit Register is shared between banks. In fact, banks are able to know from how many banks is a firm obtaining credit (as well as the amount involved). Hence, banks may be more willing to lend to a firm if they know their competitors find the firm trustworthy enough to lend to them.
Our finding is consistent with Carletti et al. (2007) , who find that banks benefit from risk diversification brought by multiple-bank lending. The decreasing interest rate reflects that the reduction in risk level overcomes free-riding and duplication of monitoring costs. However, to the contrary of the prediction of Carletti et al. (2007) that the benefit of diversification is stronger with small opaque less profitable firms, we find that the negative correlation between the number of banks and the interest rate holds robust across all firm sizes. Specifically, even large mature profitable firms benefit from multiple lending.
In addition, firms with many relationships should have more bargaining power in their relations with banks, given that they may easily obtain funding from other banks if they are not offered competitive conditions. The stronger is bank competition, the more should a firm profit from having many relationships, as banks may be more willing to beat their rivals bids to lock in a customer. In fact, the finding that the interest rate decreases in the number of banks is consistent with the competition argument by Boot and Thakor (2000) that when banks compete to gain clients, firms are able to borrow from multiple banks at lower costs. 
Data Appendix
Filters were applied, in order to guarantee a reasonable quality of the data used, even if at the cost of a lower number of observations. The first step was to exclude all observations for which debt or interest paid was negative or equalled zero, given that it would not make sense to compute implicit interest rates in such cases. We also excluded all firms which had zero employees. Such firms should be mainly holding companies or firms in liquidation, though this may also reflect isolated reporting problems in the database. Additionally, we dropped all observations below the 5st percentile and above the 95th percentile of the implicit interest rates distributions. Moreover, we dropped all observations for which the estimated implicit interest rate was below the interbank money market interest rate. Finally, we excluded all firms for which we did not have any information on the Credit Register, given that it would be impossible to compute the number of bank relationships for those firms. After applying all these filters to the implicit bank interest rate, we were left with a database with 42.263 observations between 1996 and 2004. Statistics. This interest rate is a weighted average of interest rates reported by banks. Implicit interest rates were computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. We also present an alternative measure which considers interest paid on bank loans in year t as a percentage of average debt to credit institutions at year t ant t-1 .
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Note: Empirical distribution of the implicit interest rate on bank loans, computed as interest paid to banks as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions for each firm. As interest rates show a steady downward trend during our sample period, we also present the empirical distribution of the implied spread on banks loans, defined as the difference between the implicit interest rate and a money market interest rate (3-month Euribor). The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The implicit spread on banks loans was defined as the difference between the implicit interest rate and a money market interest rate (3-month Euribor). The number of relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal, which includes data on all loans granted in Portugal above 50 euros. The number of bank relationships was computed as the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. These two databases were matched, which means that these two indicators refer to the same sample of firms. 1   2   3   4   5   1  3  5  7  9  11  13  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  41  43  45  47  49 Number of bank relationships
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Notes: The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The implicit spread on banks loans was defined as the difference between the implicit interest rate and a money market interest rate (3-month Euribor). The number of relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal, which includes data on all loans granted in Portugal above 50 euros. The number of bank relationships was computed as the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. These two databases were matched, which means that these two indicators refer to the same sample of firms.
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Notes: Interest rate were computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of relationships was computed as the number of different credit institutions which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. To ease the reading of the table we exclude firms with more than 15 relationships. Notes: The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal. The number of bank relationships was computed as the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. The definition of firm size was based on the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC), by taking into account the number of employees and sales volume. More precisely, micro firms were defined as those with less than 10 employees and less than 2 million euro of business volume; small firms were those with less than 50 employees and less than 10 million euro of business volume; medium firms were those with less than 250 employees and a business volume below 50 million euro. All remaining firms were considered to be large firms. Notes: The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal. The number of bank relationships was computed as the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. 
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Table 4 Mean comparison tests
Note: Firms with few relations were defined as those included in the first quartile of the distribution of the number of relationships. In turn, firms with many relations were considered to be those in the fourth quartile of the same distribution. 
Average
Table 5 Summary statistics for explanatory variables
Notes: The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of bank relationships was computed as the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. Turnover represents sales and services over assets. Leverage is defined as debt to credit institutions over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt coverage is defined as net profits over debt to credit institutions. Notes: An asterisk means that the pairwise correlation is significant at a 5 per cent confidence level. Turnover represents sales and services over assets. Leverage is defined as debt to credit institutions over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt coverage is defined as net profits over debt to credit institutions. 
Table 7 -Regression results
Notes: t-statistics in italics. The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of bank relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal, by counting the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. Turnover represents sales and services over assets. Leverage is defined as debt to credit institutions over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt coverage is defined as net profits over debt to credit institutions. 
Table 8 -Regression results
Notes: t-statistics in italics. The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. Concentration in lending is as Herfindhal index using bank shares at the firm level. Turnover represents sales and services over assets. Leverage is defined as debt to credit institutions over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt coverage is defined as net profits over debt to credit institutions. Notes: t-statistics in italics. The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database held by Banco de Portugal, which includes detailed accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal, by counting the number of different banks which were lending to a given firm at the end of each year. Turnover represents sales and services over assets. Leverage is defined as debt to credit institutions over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable which takes the value one when the firm is in default; and debt coverage is defined as net profits over debt to credit institutions. 
